Abstract
enforcement action through a qualified majority of members on a post-war security council and the concurrence of the four wartime allies. The Yalta agreement, Roosevelt announced to the US Congress, 'ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries -and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving Nations will finally have a chance to join' as the '. . . beginning of a permanent structure of peace.' 1 In the midst of the Cold War, the discussions at Yalta were recalled in less charitable mien by those who believed the West was naive about Stalin's ambitions. Churchill's 'percentages' agreement with Stalin on relative influence in the individual countries of central Europe and the Balkans, together with the American decision not to advance on Berlin, Prague, or Vienna in the closing days of the war, foreshadowed post-war Soviet dominance east of the Oder-Niesse line. Roosevelt's plans for joint action by the Four Policemen, with France as a fifth gendarme, were soon derailed by competition between the Soviet Union and the West over Greece and Turkey, the confrontation over Berlin, and the beginning of atomic rivalry. The United Nations Charter, for all of its durability, did not work as intended at the beginning, nor for most of its juridical career.
Collective security, to be sure, has remained a challenging alternative to the balance of power and local alliances. The lesson of World War I was that overly rigid alliance structures, such as the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance, with preset mobilization plans, could magnify a local dispute into a global war. The advent of World War II instructed that credible military capacity, as well as resolve, is necessary to stem aggression; compromise with aggressors may not be durable; and defensive alliances cannot always be cobbled together in time (witness the last hour attempt to save Poland). The competition of East and West throughout the Cold War has taught separate lessons about the limits of a universal scheme of collective security. Stability in Europe in the face of a Soviet threat depended on the strength of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and credible nuclear deterrence. The balance in the Pacific depended on a continuing American commitment to the defence of South Korea and Japan, and a moderation of the tension between Taiwan and China. The central architecture of stability was provided by defensive alliances, not by commitments of the UN Security Council.
To be sure, the NATO alliance was accommodated by the structure of the UN Charter, 2 and the defence of South Korea was advanced by the community voice of the United Nations (first in the Council, when the Soviet Union was absent, 3 7 and provided some measure of stability in Kashmir. 8 And certainly the United Nations advanced the necessary process of decolonization, pushing reticent communities in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa to accommodate majority rule. The United Nations has continued its important work in creating norms of human rights and monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And no student of American foreign policy can overlook the importance of the United Nations as a bully pulpit -used to moderate the action of both camps, exposing Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962, and reminding the United States that interventionism in its own hemisphere might seem dated. Crucially, as well, the Security Council has provided a cloakroom for consultations among the Permanent Members, one of several useful venues to clarify intentions and communicate resolve.
Nonetheless, the United Nations was hardly the keystone of post-war strategic balance. When Permanent Members became Permanent Rivals, UN collective security machinery could not operate, except as a contact group to avoid misapprehension or to handle disputes that fell outside the orbit of East-West competition. The use of Chapter VII to authorize security measures and deterrence, much less the loan of troops to the United Nations under Article 43, was a dead letter when the conflicts at hand were surrogate contests between East and West.
In the post-Cold War period, Roosevelt's exuberance about the potential of collective security has been once again entertained. The Security Council decision to deploy UN observers to monitor the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1987, 9 the military alliance that countered Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, 10 and the common interest in ending the Bosnian war, 11 seemed to signal a new capacity for action in the United Nations. But the disillusionment has been equally dramatic. It became clear that the Security Council, freed from ideological competition, is still prey to the algebraic rule of the lowest common denominator. The differences in national interest and political sympathy among Council members have meant that Council action comes late, lacks force, and focuses on 'neutral' humanitarian tasks that do not resolve a conflict. A lack of experience in robust security operations during most of its history (with the exception of Korea, the Congo, and Iraq, the first and last under US command), has disabled the United Nations from the necessary vigour of response in recent crises. The war of attrition in Bosnia from 1991 to 1995 reminded some of earlier trench warfare, and the United Nations' work in delivering humanitarian aid was an inadequate amelioration. The Serb attack on Srebrenica, and the execution of 7,000 disarmed Muslim men, exposed the helplessness of underequipped peacekeepers and the limits of UN operations when effective measures can be thwarted by each participating country. The casualties suffered in Somalia also showed that UN privileges and immunities will not protect peacekeepers against local retaliation. The inability of the United Nations to mount a force to intervene in Rwanda against the Hutu genocide showed the debilities of waiting for consensus (including, sometimes, US concurrence) before taking action. And the erosion of the UN coalition to dismantle Iraq's production of weapons of mass destruction has exposed the limited coincidence of national preferences. What the economists call a 'collective action' problem is unhappily apropos -no particular actor has any incentive to sacrifice his interests for the provision of a public good such as security, when someone else may undertake the task.
The Question of Unilateral Action
Lawyers are inclined to approach any question with immediate reference to the governing text, and in the case of the use of force, the limitations of the UN Charter are of obvious moment. The foundational principles of interpretation of a treaty text are widely agreed, whether or not the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ever gains universal adherence.
12 But the interpretive principles deployed in the application of a constitutive text may also depend on the nature of the values and interests at stake -the teleology of an instrument as much as its literal form. This is not to deny a claim of objectivity in interpretation, but at a minimum, values and interests are likely to influence state practice, which in turn must inform the meaning given to a treaty undertaking.
Tolerance for unilateral action in the post-Cold War arena depends in part on a theory of security -what human goods are at stake, and whether forcible interference is necessary for their preservation. There are many other disincentives, besides the use of force, to deter provocative conduct, including loss of community reputation, loss of access to the private capital market, and the suspension of bilateral cooperation. 13 Constructivists also posit that the enunciation of international norms may gradually transform an actor's own preferences, not just for the sake of preserving reputation but because the actor comes to embrace community goals as his own. And in situations where the use or threat of force appears unavoidable, the temptation to act unilaterally still must be tested by other concerns such as limiting the escalation and domain of a conflict, guarding against partiality, and preserving the credibility of multilateral machinery.
But when push come to shove, waiting for unanimity may sometimes fail to protect other values at stake. Just as a domestic system of governance requiring the agreement of all communities will often fail to function (as we have seen in the attempt to reconstruct the domestic government of Bosnia and Herzegovina), so too a system of international action requiring full concurrence may prove inadequate. A passive system of security -favouring inaction over action -can avoid the danger of provocation of one superpower by another, but prove unable to meet other challenges truly threatening to international peace. Demanding multilateral authorization for action in all places and circumstances may limit the efficacy of multilateral and unilateral diplomacy, as well as good offices.
14 And if we define human security in broader terms, as the January 1992 Security Council Heads of State Summit prescribed, 15 then a system of inaction is all the more troublesome. This castigation of collective machinery does not assume ill will on the part of any national actor. The foreign policy decisions of member countries are often limited by the demands of their domestic constituencies, certainly in democracies, and even autocratic governments and societies can be held captive by violent or destabilizing factions. National actors can be overawed by the size and ambitions of their regional neighbours, by the threat of retaliation, and by the inducements of commercial and political advantage.
Since Security Council machinery has never worked quite as anticipated, there are widely accepted conventions designed to increase its effectiveness and capacity for action. Article 43 agreements were not forthcoming in the Cold War, 16 and even now, no country has offered to commit troops to the Council's automatic disposal, even for peacekeeping. 17 Multilateral enforcement has instead been mounted by Security Council 'recommendations' or 'authorization' to member states undertaking coalition military action. 18 The Charter text demands that nonprocedural decisions by the Security Council, including decisions under Chapter VII, should be supported by the affirmative vote of nine members 'including the concurring votes of the permanent members'. 19 This, too, has not been observed in practice. The permanent members have often abstained, permitting a decision to go forward, and the abstention has not counted as a veto. 20 Other fora for security recommendations to member states have also been tolerated, such as the General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution in the Korean conflict. 21 Multilateralism has thus assumed forms unanticipated in 1945. The limited capacity of the Security Council to respond robustly to identified threats to peace and security is also met in part by the UN Charter's explicit protection of the right of self-defence in Article 51, 22 permitting both individual and collective action to meet an armed attack. Even the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 23 renouncing the use of Clausewitzian war, was interpreted by the United States to preserve the right of self-defence and the right of each state to judge its necessary circumstances (a reading 24 But the reach of Article 51 has proven troublesome in several circumstances that fallible draftsmen did not anticipate.
First, the Article 51 text does not address the possible need for the unilateral use of force at an earlier stage. The inadequacy of waiting for an attack to be mounted is evident in the very framing of Article 39, allowing collective action to meet a 'threat to the peace' or an 'act of aggression'. 25 In circumstances where the Council is stymied, it requires a blinkered and sanguine positivism to conclude that no threat exists and that inaction is always preferable. The presumption of Article 106 must surely give us pause, even now -the Charter's assertion that until the Council has at its disposal a working system of enforcement with Article 43 troops at hand, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security must continue to rest upon the world war allies, with the far looser instruction to merely 'consult' with each other and other UN members 'with a view to such joint action . . . as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.' 26 Weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of remote delivery, make the problems of a Council monopoly even more telling. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is not per se illegal under international law, and even where a country has violated a treaty undertaking, the violation has not been deemed equivalent to an armed attack. Yet stability in a real world may depend on avoiding break-outs that also betoken hostile intent. The Cuban missile crisis can be interpreted in this light; the Soviet Union's deployment of offshore intermediate range missiles would have altered the strategic nuclear balance, as well as boosting Moscow's ability to intimidate states in the hemisphere and endangering crisis diplomacy by shortening delivery time. The creativity of international lawyers in justifying the American response as the execution of mere 'recommendations' by the OAS 27 does not change a realist's account of strategic self-defence. The 1962 crisis may not be the alternative that the quarantine might not fall within the reach of Article 2(4) in the first place. 'The quarantine was surely a threat if not a use of force, but was it against the political independence or territorial integrity of Cuba? Of Russia? Or, alternatively, was it "in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations?"' Comment by Louis Henkin, in Chayes, supra, at 149, 152.
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Article 2(7) states: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.' 29 Article 53(1) states: 'The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state . . .' last of its kind -the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by governments that manifest hostile intent, as well as state tolerance for weapons acquisition by terrorist groups resident within their borders -is likely to goad even well-intentioned neighbours to seek security against misuse.
But the erosion of a classical account of Chapter VII comes from a different quarter as well -the expanded account of human security and human rights. The Somali famine and civil conflict among clans, the fratricidal wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the earlier conflicts in South Africa and Rhodesia, have been characterized by the Security Council as threats to international peace and security. This morally driven reading of Chapter VII has been buttressed by adventitious reference to refugee flows and regional stability, but it has a teleologic lesson even where these special circumstances are missing. The UN Charter is designed to preserve certain human goods, and the violence of civil conflict can threaten them as gravely as international conflict. The Council's duty to act in accordance with international law has an obverse effect, for Council action influences our perception of what the law is. A broadened interpretation of Chapter VII that marks civil conflicts as threats to international peace and security may justify a wider reading of Article 51 and Chapter VIII as well, embracing a right of 'collective self-defence' against a government's armed attacks on its own population and a strengthened right of regional action. The defence of a minority against ethnic slaughter in a civil conflict is surely of as much concern as the defence of a juridical state in international war, if humane values are the criterion. The authority of international human rights law challenges any characterization of this as intermeddling, even without Council action, for the scope of a country's 'domestic jurisdiction' under Article 2(7) is limited by these fundamental constraints on sovereignty.
A broadened notion of human security also helps to justify greater latitude in our account of the regional action permitted under Chapter VIII. Some observers have presumed that regional enforcement action must be authorized explicitly and in advance by the Council. But the text of Article 53 is not unambiguous, 29 and state practice has evolved in varying directions. Regional 'recommendations' have been claimed to be distinct from 'enforcement action' in the Cuban missile crisis and 30 Regional intervention to quell the fighting in the West African states of Liberia and Sierra Leone has been ratified by the Council after the operations were well underway, with no note of remonstration or chastisement at the initial decision of ECOWAS to forge ahead. 31 The argument that prior Council action is necessary may appear almost circular -based on the premise that a looser-jointed system is undesirable and could not have been intended by the San Francisco signatories. 32 This originalist question may in any event be tabled by evolving practice.
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Unilateral or regional action will gain greater comfort when it is bracketed by Council diagnoses of a crisis situation. Varying situations have obtained in the recent interventions in Rwanda, Liberia, Kosovo and Iraq. In Rwanda, the ongoing slaughter was denounced by the Security Council, even though no agreement could be obtained on the mustering of a peacekeeping force to replace the UNAMIR mission. The insertion of troops by France in Operation Turquoise was authorized in Resolution 929 as a temporary measure under Chapter VII until UNAMIR could be brought up to strength, allowing the establishment of a 'multinational operation . . . for humanitarian purposes'. 34 The locus of the protected safe zone was determined by French forces on their own authority, however, in the Cyangugu-Kiguye-Gilongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda, with some later criticism that the intervention served to shield retreating Hutu genocidaires. In Liberia and Sierra Leone alike, the United Nations declined involvement at the time of ECOMOG's initial military intervention, but in subsequent Council resolutions -including decisions to impose arms embargoes and establish joint peacekeeping monitors -the ECOWAS operations were noted with approval. 35 In Kosovo, the Council condemned Belgrade's indiscriminate attacks on ethnic Albanian communities as a threat to regional peace 36 and endorsed the Contact Group's attempt to negotiate substantial autonomy for the province, 37 also authorizing the use of force to protect OSCE 'verifiers' deployed to monitor the partial withdrawal of Serb police and military. 38 No resolution was presented to authorize the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia following the failure of the Rambouillet negotiations (in the face of a probable Russian veto), but the Council overwhelmingly rejected Russia's draft resolution that would have condemned the NATO bombing. 39 After the campaign, the Security Council also acted under Chapter VII to authorize the deployment of an 'international military presence' to supervise Serb withdrawal from the province, an engagement hard to reconcile with any claim that the Council considered the NATO campaign to be ultra vires aggression. 40 The Kosovo intervention presents the curious picture of Council authorization before and aft, while dodging the NATO bullet. 41 In the Iraq crisis of 1997-1998, when Saddam Hussein blocked UN inspections designed to find weapons of mass destruction, the Security Council refrained from finding that Iraq was in 'breach' of the ceasefire terms that ended the Gulf War. 42 But the Council did declare that Iraq was in 'flagrant violation' of its ceasefire obligations. 43 The Council's President warned that 'serious consequences' would flow from Iraq's failure to allow the inspections 44 and condemned the regime's 'clear violation of the relevant resolutions'. 45 In an earlier episode of obstruction in 1993, the Council President categorized interference with the arms inspections as an 'unacceptable and material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687', 46 and in the earlier episode, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom conducted air raids on sites in southern Iraq. In 1997-1998, the United Kingdom and the United States, with offers of support from a dozen other nations, again threatened air operations, finally conducting four days of raids in December 1998 after Iraq breached its renewed undertakings to the Secretary-General. This was an instance where the Council withheld the comfort of immediate authorization, but a claim of continued authority could be drawn from standing Council resolutions. 47 Perhaps the most difficult instance of unilateral action has been the United States air strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan, justified by Washington as necessary self-defence against terrorist action. The use of military force to protect nationals and to disrupt ongoing terrorist action is not generally disputed, and the dangerousness of the network of Osama bin Laden is widely accepted. The timing and targeting of the strikes was designed to avoid collateral damage to neighbouring civilian and diplomatic sites. The United States filed an Article 51 letter with the Security Council. 48 But the problem of striking at a terrorist organization within the territory of another state, much less overflying the borders of a third-party country, was further complicated by the dilemma of sensitive targeting information. The common international view is that the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum was erroneously selected, and this conclusion could not be effectively dislodged without drawing upon intelligence sources considered essential to the continuing effort to thwart bin Laden's terrorism. 49 The dilemma of adequate public justification, whether ex ante or ex post, is all too evident when an ongoing military effort depends upon closely held tactical information.
When a country or coalition is tempted to act without explicit Security Council authorization, the potential cost to Council authority must be prominently in mind. At a minimum, the underlying reasons for Council involvement should be part of the decision process. The need to avoid escalation of the conflict and to communicate the limited aim of the intervention, the virtue of consulting with other interested countries (where circumstances possibly allow), and the impartiality suggested by broadly based coalition action, are continuing goods. The unilateral course of action must also be urgent enough that the actor is willing to bear the political costs of castigation -for the maintenance of the credibility of multilateral machinery may depend, at times, on a public insistence that another course should have been chosen, even where it is conceded in private that there was no other choice.
